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Editors Preface 
We are happy to present Research Paper No. 23 - ‘The Puzzle of Recon-
ciliation after Genocide and the Role of Social Identities: Evidence from 
Burundi and Rwanda’ by political scientist Theresa Reinold, Junior Pro-
fessor for Global and Transnational Cooperation Research at the Uni-
versity of Duisburg-Essen. The paper explores identity politics as a key 
factor for explaining the successes and failures of officially orchestrated 
reconciliation processes after mass atrocities. Rwanda and Burundi are 
presented as examples of how different approaches chosen by the respec-
tive governments have affected reconciliation in deeply divided societies. 
Based on ample empirical evidence, Reinold concludes that neither in Bu-
rundi nor in Rwanda have antagonistic social identities been successfully 
transformed after genocide. But there is good news too. While attempts 
to impose an overarching ‘national’ identity have largely failed, coopera-
tion at the micro-level, which lacked any coercive character and which 
enabled intimate social contact between the former antagonists, seems to 
have been rather effective in reconstructing social identities and promot-
ing reconciliation. The paper is only meant to be ‘a first plausibility probe 
into the identity-reconciliation nexus in post-conflict societies’, as Reinold 
modestly declares. But it nevertheless offers important insights in forms 
and outcomes of transitional justice mechanisms and thereby contributes 
to our ongoing research on ‘pathways and mechanisms’ of cooperation at 
multiple levels.
Volker Heins
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the Role of Social Identities: Evidence from  
Burundi and Rwanda 
1 Introduction
The question of how societies emerging from genocide, torn apart by months, 
years, sometimes decades of extreme violence, manage to return to normal-
cy, restore social relationships and lay the foundation for sustainable peace 
is a thoroughly puzzling one. It is not intuitively plausible that people who 
chopped each other’s families and friends into pieces can go on to peacefully 
co-exist, attend village meetings, engage in neighborly banter, pray together at 
church – in short, do things that regular people do together in their daily lives. 
The guiding hypothesis underlying this research paper is that identity politics 
is a key factor for explaining the successes and failures of reconciliation pro-
cesses. I will first elaborate the argument theoretically, drawing on the volu-
minous literature on conflict transformation and reconciliation, where social 
psychologists have made important contributions, as well as the equally vo-
luminous literature on transitional justice (TJ), which is dominated by legal 
scholars and political scientists. Thereinafter I will illustrate my argument 
empirically based on two different post-genocide societies, namely Burundi 
and Rwanda, which are similar in many critical aspects yet have adopted 
extremely different approaches to identity politics and reconciliation. This is 
by no means intended as a systematic comparative case study, but merely as 
a first plausibility probe into the dynamics of reconciliation and the role of 
identity politics therein. More rigorous and systematic comparative research 
will be necessary to arrive at reasonably certain causal inferences about the 
reconciliation-identity link in post-genocide societies.
Now, why is this relevant? There are two answers to this question, one fo-
cusing on the policy implications of such an endeavour, the other one on its 
academic significance. To begin with, in light of the amount of (donor) re-
sources that are going into reconciliation and peacebuilding projects around 
the world, it is quite striking that all this money, all these efforts are devoted 
towards an endeavor whose outcome is so uncertain and whose underlying 
mechanisms we understand so little (Skaar 2013: 56f). Since the end of the 
Cold War the international community has spent well over a billion dollars 
on transitional justice projects (Weinstein 2011: 1). The South African Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), for instance, cost more than 50 mil-
lion US dollars; the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) costs 
a whopping 177 million US dollars per year; and its Rwandan counterpart 
4(ICTR) spent one billion US dollars between 1995 and 2007 (Ibid). Identify-
ing the complex causal linkages underlying post-conflict reconciliation pro-
cesses – including the impact of transitional justice mechanisms – will thus 
provide policy-makers with more effective tools for reconciliation and peace-
building in conflict-torn societies, thereby preventing a relapse of these coun-
tries into violence in the medium- and long-term. Second, this research paper 
equally seeks to contribute to the academic debate about reconciliation and 
identity politics. Despite a vast literature we still know very little about the 
exact causal mechanisms underlying reconciliation in societies emerging from 
mass atrocities, one of the reasons for this being the near-total absence of in-
terdisciplinary work on this issue (but see Aiken 2013; Ford 2012; Milanovic 
2016a and 2016b). This is all the more regrettable as one cannot fully grasp 
the dynamics that are of interest to this research paper – which play out at the 
micro- as well as macro-levels – without synthesizing insights from different 
disciplines that focus on these different levels of analysis. 
In the following, different bodies of research will be canvassed. To begin with, 
the voluminous literature on TJ, a field to which legal scholars and political 
scientists have made important contributions, will be reviewed. However, this 
literature has not been able to identify the causal mechanisms linking TJ to 
reconciliation – one reason being TJ enthusiasts’ lack of appreciation of the 
ambivalent role of social identities, which have often presented a stumbling 
block for TJ mechanisms’ attempt to establish a historical record shared by all 
antagonists and end the culture of denialism that often pervades post-conflict 
societies. Second, the equally voluminous literature on conflict transforma-
tion and reconciliation will be discussed, where social psychologists, who usu-
ally address specific aspects of this process at the micro-level at the expense 
of macro-level forces, have taken a leading role. While a number of important 
studies in this field have been authored by political scientists and sociologists 
who are more cognizant of the larger political context, such research tends to 
focus on single-case studies, whereas comparative studies across post-geno-
cide societies remain wanting, especially those integrating micro- and macro-
level perspectives. 
The paper seeks to address the following questions: have antagonistic identi-
ties been successfully transformed after genocide in the cases under scrutiny? 
Have macro-level initiatives such as government-imposed superordinate iden-
tities led to reconciliation? Alternatively, have micro-level reconciliation pro-
jects, for instance those involving cooperation in the pursuit of superordinate 
goals, been effective? Which other factors affect the reconciliation process and 
how do the different factors interact? The main findings can be summarized 
as follows: in neither Rwanda nor Burundi have antagonistic identities been 
successfully transformed after genocide, although one must distinguish be-
tween macro- and micro-level interventions. Imposing a superordinate iden-
tity in a top-down process has not been very effective in either case, whereas 
there is some evidence suggesting that bottom-up cooperation has been rather 
5successful in reconstructing social identities and promoting reconciliation in 
the case of Rwanda. Transitional justice in turn plays a rather ambivalent role 
in post-conflict settings. It seems that TJ can only be effective if it is perceived 
as being applied in an even-handed fashion, and if the political environment 
is supportive of accountability-seeking. Neither condition is entirely fulfilled 
in Rwanda or Burundi. 
The paper is structured as follows: to begin with, I will clarify core concepts 
and review the vast literature on transitional justice and conflict transforma-
tion. Subsequently, the ‘identity factor’ will be introduced and applied to the 
cases of Rwanda and Burundi. Finally, preliminary findings will be presented 
and open questions for future research identified. 
2 Core Concepts
This section will define core concepts employed in this paper, starting with 
genocide. I will use a conceptualization proposed by Barbara Harff, which is 
widely accepted in genocide research and which expands upon the definition 
of genocide in the Genocide Convention: ‘Genocides and politicides are the 
promotion, execution, and/or implied consent of sustained policies by govern-
ing elites or their agents – or, in the case of civil war, either of the contend-
ing authorities – that are intended to destroy, in whole or part, a communal, 
political, or politicized ethnic group’ (2003: 58). Genocide thus represents 
‘intergroup behavior at its most horrific extreme’, where individuals are se-
lected for annihilation merely because of their membership in a devalued so-
cial group (Hogg and Abrams 1998: 1).
Genocide has a severe impact on the social fabric of a country. Basic human 
needs – security, physical integrity, and esteem – are profoundly frustrated. 
Genocide divides people into perpetrators, victims, and bystanders (Hilberg 
1993), even though sometimes the line between the three groups becomes 
blurred, as some people may be both victims and perpetrators, for instance. 
Each of these groups is affected differently by genocidal violence. In the course 
of genocidal violence, the perpetrators come to adopt a de-humanizing atti-
tude towards the victims, whom they exclude from the moral universe, as a 
result of which the inhibitions people normally have against using violence 
against others disappear. As Ervin Staub notes, ‘[t]here is a reverse of morality, 
so that killing becomes the right thing to do’ (2003: 305). The moral fabric of 
society thus becomes severely damaged as conventional notions of right and 
wrong cease to exist. Group dynamics assume a critical role in this context, as 
they come to ‘dominate the psychology of perpetrators. Embedded in a group, 
trained in submission to authority, and further indoctrinated in ideology, peo-
ple give up individual decision making to the group and its leaders. The ‘We’ 
6acquires substantial power, in place of the “I”’ (Ibid.). Genocide perpetrators 
thus exhibit the submissive tendencies Milgram famously discovered in his 
electroshock experiment - where participants administered what they thought 
were severe electroshocks to innocent people merely because a person in a 
position of authority told them to - at their extreme. Societies experiencing 
genocidal violence undergo a ‘resocialization in beliefs, values, and standards 
of conduct. New institutions emerge that serve repression, discrimination, 
and the mistreatment of identified victims. They represent new realities, a 
new status quo’ (Ibid.).
Just as perpetrators dehumanize their victims in order to rationalize their own 
participation in mass atrocities, bystanders to the genocide also feel social 
distance between themselves and the victims, although it does not have to go 
as far as dehumanizing the latter. However, a certain degree of social distance 
between victims and bystanders is necessary in order for the latter to stand 
by while innocent people are being slaughtered on a massive scale (Staub 
1978). Changing societal norms regarding the use of violence against the vic-
tim groups further bolster bystanders in their passivity. As Paul Slovic put it, 
does such seeming indifference to the suffering of others reveal some ‘funda-
mental deficiency in our humanity’? (2007: 79). Slovic draws on affect theory 
to explain inaction in the face of mass atrocities. The role of affect, i.e. the 
‘positive and negative feelings that combine with reasoned analysis to guide 
our judgments, decisions, and actions’ (Ibid.) in motivating human behavior, 
has been extensively studied by psychologists (see, e.g., Clark and Fiske 1982; 
Forgas 2000; Tomkins 1962; Tomkins 1963). Slovic uses affect to explain 
why people often remain passive in the face of genocide: ‘One fundamental 
mechanism that may play a role in many, if not all, episodes of mass-murder 
neglect involves the capacity to experience affect …. The reported numbers 
of deaths represent dry statistics .… that fail to spark emotion or feeling and 
thus fail to motivate action’ (2007: 79). 
Finally, victims experience genocidal violence as a deeply traumatic event, as 
an extreme form of disempowerment. In the aftermath of genocide, survivors 
struggle with a desire for revenge, an inability to forgive, but also fear of re-
peated victimization, acute loneliness, alienation from their fellow citizens, an 
inability to trust, etc. Consequently, most existing research on victims of gen-
ocide has addressed post-traumatic stress symptoms, the trans-generational 
transmission of trauma, and a desire for revenge exhibited by survivors (Field 
and Chhim 2008; Sagi-Schwartz et al. 2008), but also, albeit less frequently, 
positive effects such as resilience in the face of adversity, coping mechanisms, 
and empowerment (Gasparre et al. 2010; Suedfeld 2000; Shnabel et al. 2009). 
Now, while (genocidal) violence may be ended through a peace agreement, 
it is widely agreed in the literature that this form of conflict settlement is not 
sufficient to create a reconciled society (Bar-Tal 2000; Bar-Tal and Bennink 
2004; Kriesberg 2001, 2004; Lederach 1997; Long and Brecke 2003; Staub, 
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conflict settlement, is desirable because studies indicate that violence is likely 
to resume when a conflict has been settled but underlying grievances and hos-
tile attitudes towards the out-group have not changed (De la Rey 2001; Staub 
and Bar-Tal 2003). 
This research paper therefore adopts a definition of reconciliation put for-
ward by Herbert Kelman, who sees reconciliation as a process of identity 
change, whereby the negation of the former antagonist is no longer a defining 
feature of one’s own identity: ‘Changing one’s collective identity by removing 
the negation of the other from it implies a degree of acceptance of the other’s 
identity ... The change in each party’s identity may go further by moving to-
ward the development of a common, transcendent identity – not in lieu of, but 
alongside of each group’s particularistic identity … What is essential to rec-
onciliation, in my view, is that each party revise its own identity just enough 
to accommodate the identity of the other’ (2008: 24; see also Kelman 2004, 
1999a, 1999b). 
3 The State of the Art
Surprisingly, the link between the reconstruction of group identities and 
reconciliation first articulated by Herbert Kelman has been somewhat over-
looked in the burgeoning TJ literature. TJ designates the ‘full range of pro-
cesses and mechanisms associated with a society’s attempts to come to terms 
with a legacy of large-scale past abuses, in order to ensure accountability, 
serve justice, and achieve reconciliation’ (Annan 2004: 4). Debates about TJ 
have centered on a number of overarching questions about the evolution, 
form, locus, and consequences of TJ (e.g., Arthur 2011; Biggar 2001; Brahm 
2007; Brounéus 2008; Byrne 2004; Buckley-Zistel et al. 2014; Chapman and 
van der Merwe 2008; Clark 2010; Clark 2012; DeBrito et al. 2001; Drumbl 
2007; Elster 2006; Fletcher and Weinstein 2002; Gibson 2004; Hayner 2002; 
Kritz 1995; Lundy and McGovern 2008; Lutz and Sikkink 2001; Minow 
1998; Orentlicher 2010; Roht-Arriaza and Mariezcurrena 2006; Schabas and 
Darcy 2004; Shaw and Waldorf 2010; Sriram 2004; Stover and Weinstein 
2004; Teitel 2000). 
For a long time, TJ was uncritically embraced as normatively desirable, al-
though its impact on reconciliation actually remains poorly understood. A 
recent meta-review (Skaar 2013: 55f) of three literature reviews on TJ and 
reconciliation (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2008; Hazan 2006; Mendeloff 2004) 
concludes that ‘there is a huge gap in our empirical knowledge with respect to 
what transitional justice may or may not do for reconciliation’ (Skaar 2013: 
56f; for similar conclusions see Duggan 2010: 315; Fletcher and Weinstein 
82002: 585). With regard to the specific category of genocidal violence, a 
2012 study on the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(ICTY) points out that ‘the linkage between criminal trials and reconciliation 
is especially tenuous in genocide cases’ (Clark 2012: 55). Other TJ skeptics 
voice similar concerns, arguing that the digging up of painful memories may 
reactivate tensions and thus undermine societal peace (see, f.ex. Snyder and 
Vinjamuri 2003; Stover and Weinstein 2004: 323). This challenges the ar-
gument defended by TJ enthusiasts – such as former ICTY Judge Richard 
Goldstone – that there can be no reconciliation, no lasting peace without jus-
tice (Lewis 1995). In the absence of rigorous comparative research, it will be 
impossible to state the scope of conditions under which TJ has one effect or 
the other. Unfortunately, ‘[t]he bulk of impact assessment studies on reconcili-
ation are single-case studies, which although may be superbly conducted have 
relatively limited value in terms of generalization’ (Skaar 2013: 57). 
What is more, the findings from different studies about the same country 
sometimes contradict each other: whereas one prominent study on the im-
pact of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), for 
instance, finds that truth-telling had a positive effect (Gibson 2004), another 
widely cited study challenges the idea that the TRC contributed to societal 
healing (Chapman and van der Merwe 2008). This flurry of ‘competing sto-
ries’ unfortunately ‘does not provide policymakers with a sound empirical 
foundation for making informed decisions about when, where and how to 
promote transitional justice in countries emerging from war or authoritarian-
ism’ (Thoms, Ron, and Paris 2008: 12). Much of the existing research, Oskar 
Thoms et al. maintain, is ‘analytically weak, relying largely on impressionistic 
descriptions of a small number of well-known cases, rather than systemati-
cally comparing impacts across a broad range of cases’ (Ibid.: 5). In a similar 
vein, Harvey Weinstein laments that ‘[a]necdotes abound, assumptions re-
main untouched by lack of evidence’ (2011: 1).
Another obstacle to a better understanding of the TJ-reconciliation link is the 
lack of appreciation for the ‘identity factor’ in much (albeit not all) of this lit-
erature (Aiken 2013: 211). Nevin Aiken makes an important point in stressing 
that in order to fully understand the effects of TJ on reconciliation, we need 
to engage the ‘fundamental issues of collective identity at the root of mass 
violence’ because TJ has a role to play in reconstructing or possibly cement-
ing the antagonistic identities that had given rise to conflict in the first place 
(Ibid.: 25). He regrets that ‘no attempt has yet been made to synthesize the 
structural and institutional insights of transitional justice and the social and 
psychological theories of identity and intergroup reconciliation developed in 
the conflict transformation literature’ (Ibid.: 3). While Aiken has merged these 
two strands of the literature in his study of reconciliation in Northern Ireland 
and South Africa (Ibid.), he does not address the peculiarities of post-genocide 
societies, which are the subject of this research paper. Nonetheless, his work 
represents an important step towards a sustained interdisciplinary dialogue 
9that could significantly improve our understanding of reconciliation. 
Interestingly, a parallel development has begun in the discipline of interna-
tional law, where scholars have begun to apply social psychological theories 
to the functioning of international criminal courts. Stuart Ford (2012) kicked 
off the debate with an excellent study demonstrating how people’s percep-
tion of these courts are filtered through various cognitive biases which gen-
erally make these courts’ perceived legitimacy a negative-sum game. Marko 
Milanovic (2016b) in turn equally draws upon social psychology in order to 
explain why the ICTY has struggled to transform the culture of denialism 
that is still prevalent in many parts of the former Yugoslavia. Both studies 
furnish fascinating, yet partial insights into the processes of reconciliation in 
post-genocide societies that also inform the theoretical framework elaborated 
below.  
In order to piece together the puzzle of reconciliation, it thus seems worth-
while to venture into the territory of social psychologists. In the following, I 
will provide an overview of the conflict transformation literature, where social 
psychologists have assumed a leading role, even though scholars from other 
disciplines have made relevant contributions as well. In-group favoritism and 
out-group discrimination (Tajfel and Turner 1986), conflict-supporting group 
narratives (so-called ‘chosen traumas’, see Volkan 2001; see also Bar-Tal et 
al. 2014), social distance and dehumanization of ‘the Other’ (Haagensen and 
Croes 2012; Halpern and Weinstein 2004; Harris and Fiske 2011) are all 
identity-related dynamics that are known to contribute to the escalation of 
violence into genocidal behavior (Staub 1989 and 2003). Thus, if reconcili-
ation is to succeed, the antagonistic identities underlying the escalation of 
violence will have to be somehow reconstructed. However, while intuitively 
appealing, this strategy is fraught with many difficulties, as group identities 
fulfil important psychological functions, and during conflict people go to ex-
tremes to keep their identities intact. 
So how can it be done? As Walter Stephan self-critically notes in a recent vol-
ume summing up the state of the art on the issue, ‘[o]ur understanding of how 
to bring about intergroup reconciliation is in its infancy’ (2008: 389). Exist-
ing social-psychological research addresses specific aspects of the reconcilia-
tion puzzle, namely those related to the emotional changes involved in recon-
ciliation, such as feelings of collective guilt (Branscombe and Miron 2004) or 
collective victimhood (Shnabel et al. 2013), victims’ need for empowerment 
(Shnabel et al. 2009), trauma and recovery (Pearlman 2013), the effects of 
truth-telling on victims’ mental health (Brounéus 2008; Byrne 2004), the role 
of forgiveness (Noor et al. 2008; Staub et al. 2005) or the effects of specific 
media interventions on reconciliation (Bilali 2014; Paluck 2009; Staub 2014). 
Education specialists in turn have explored the role of curricular reform in 
reconciliation processes (Bellino 2015; Oglesby 2007; Rubin 2016; Swimelar 
2013; Tawil and Harley 2004; Warshauer Freedman et al. 2008). 
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The reconstruction of social identities fueling conflict has equally been ad-
dressed to a certain extent. While (re-)engineering social identities has prov-
en unproblematic in laboratory studies (e.g., Dovidio et al. 1997), changing 
people’s sense of belonging in applied settings is fraught with many diffi-
culties (Pettigrew 1998), and naturally, post-conflict societies are especially 
challenging. While some research on identity-engineering has been carried 
out outside of the laboratory situation (e.g., Guerra et al 2013; Shnabel et 
al. 2013), Sigrun Moss and Johanna Vollhardt (2016: 328f) point out that 
post-genocide societies have received little attention from social psycholo-
gists. However, upon closer inspection one finds that some research has been 
done within and outside the discipline of social psychology: on Bosnia, Sa-
bina Cehajic et al. 2008 and Leonard et al. 2016 have produced interesting 
insights, the Holocaust has equally received some scholarly attention (e.g., 
Wohl and Branscombe 2005), and quite a few studies have been published 
on Rwanda (e.g., Buckley-Zistel 2006; Buckley-Zistel 2009; Eltringham and 
van Hoyweghen 2000; Hintjens 2008; Kanazayire et al. 2014; Longman and 
Rutagengwa 2004; Thomson 2011; Vandeginste 2014; Zorbas 2009). While 
these contributions have offered interesting insights, as single case studies 
their potential for theory-building remains limited. 
In sum, existing research has not been able to fully piece together the puzzle 
of reconciliation and the role of identity politics therein. The challenge lies 
in integrating micro- as well as macro-level perspectives, but owing to dis-
ciplinary divides, existing studies tend to adopt either one perspective or the 
other, but rarely both. In order to improve our understanding of reconcilia-
tion dynamics, hitherto disparate disciplines need to be joined and more com-
parisons across cases must be carried out. Social psychologists have generated 
important insights into the dynamics of intergroup conflict and the role of 
social identities therein, focusing on post-conflict psychological changes in in-
dividuals and groups. TJ scholars in turn – predominantly political scientists 
and lawyers – have researched the contribution of macro-level interventions 
to peacebuilding and reconciliation. What is missing is a holistic approach 
that takes into account structural factors at the macro-level (such as the insti-
tutional design of post-conflict polities, scope conditions for effective TJ in-
terventions, the role of political elites, the conflict-narratives they propagate, 
media discourse, the role of education, etc.) on the one hand, and the changes 
induced in identity constructions at the micro-level on the other hand. Rich-
ard Ashmore et al. lament that ‘[a]lthough self and identity play a critical role 
in some (perhaps most) intergroup conflicts, social scientific analyses of that 
role have thus far been largely isolated from each other’ (2001: 4). 
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4 Theoretical Framework: the Identity Factor 
The leading hypothesis of this research paper is that identity politics are a key 
factor shaping the dynamics of reconciliation processes. Identity is variable 
rather than a constant (Abdelal et al. 2006), which can be mobilized for both 
conflict and peace (Anderson 1983; Anstey et al. 2016; Connor 1994; Fearon 
and Laitin 2000; Hastings 1997; Horowitz 1985; Kaufman 2001; Kaufman 
2006). The politics of identity (Laclau 1994; see also Calhoun 1994; Eder et 
al. 2002) is therefore integral to processes of conflict escalation and de-esca-
lation. Social identities fulfil important functions for individuals seeking to 
preserve their self-esteem and trying to make sense of the world, yet they also 
provide the basis for discrimination of ‘the Other’ and antagonistic relations 
between social groups. The world is a complex and oftentimes messy place, 
and human beings have an innate need to reduce this complexity and to per-
ceive social reality as orderly, coherent and predictable. Social categorization 
helps human beings to do just that. 
Social Identity Theory (SIT) (Tajfel 1974; Tajfel and Turner 1986) and Self-
Categorization Theory (Turner 1985; Turner et al. 1987) are the two leading 
approaches developed to explain the causes and consequences of social cat-
egorization. Social identity consists ‘of those aspects of an individual’s self-
image that derive from the social categories to which he perceives himself as 
belonging’ (Tajfel and Turner 1986: 16). SIT posits that individuals generally 
seek to maintain a positive concept of themselves, and that membership in a 
positively valued social group contributes to this goal (Tajfel 1974: 67ff). Yet 
social categories do not merely provide emotional benefits, they also offer 
certain cognitive advantages in that they help individuals simplify reality by 
categorizing objects and people. Social categorization leads to in-group – out-
group distinctions, and the resulting in-group favoritism tends to create an 
atmosphere of competition and distrust between groups, at times escalating 
into violence (Tajfel and Turner 1986). 
The good news is, however, that social identities are not set in stone, and 
that they can be reconstructed to allow for more positive and less hostile 
intergroup-relations. Identity politics can therefore play both a constructive 
and a destructive role. The challenge for those wishing to promote reconcili-
ation in post-genocide societies lies in striking a balance between encourag-
ing the former antagonists to revise those elements of their identity that call 
for discrimination of the former outgroup – which, as Kelman points out, is 
extremely sensitive for parties involved in an oftentimes protracted, existen-
tial identity conflict – all the while retaining the core of their cherished social 
identity (2008: 26). In this context, the creation of a new, superordinate iden-
tity incorporating all conflict parties is believed to be conducive to reconcili-
ation (Ibid.: 24).   
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The role of inter-group cooperation
How can the development of such a transcendent identity be encouraged? 
Cooperation seems to be the magic bullet. The idea is as simple as it is en-
ticing: when people cooperate in order to achieve a shared goal which they 
cannot reach individually, they will come to like each other. Gordon Allport 
(1954) first articulated the notion that inter-group hostility can be overcome 
by fostering contact between social groups. However, not any kind of contact 
will do, some forms of contact may even exacerbate tensions. In later years, 
researchers therefore sought to refine Allport’s contact hypothesis by adding 
a number of scope conditions, with Yehuda Amir (1969) arguing that contact 
must take place under conditions of equal status, as power asymmetries would 
likely heighten tensions, and Muzafer Sherif et al. (1961; see also Sherif 1958) 
demonstrating that cooperation toward superordinate goals must take place 
repeatedly, which will in turn foster a new ‘we-feeling’ among the former an-
tagonists. Stephen Worchel, Virginia Andreoli and Robert Folger (1977) later 
found that Sherif’s assumption only holds when cooperation is successful, and 
Thomas Pettigrew (1998) emphasized the need for an environment support-
ive of contact, especially support from in-group leaders. The latter condition 
in particular points to the need to take into account macro-level dynamics 
when studying reconciliation at the micro-level – the role of political elites, 
public institutions, the media, etc. 
Studies of mixed sports teams, cooperatives, and other joint endeavors across 
societal divides have supported the notion that cooperation towards superor-
dinate goals will significantly ameliorate inter-group relations: Reuben Baron 
(2008: 288ff), for instance, describes how a rather dramatic change in social 
identity occurred when Jews and Arabs were playing on a mixed soccer team. 
He even enthusiastically suggests that, in order to reduce tensions in the Mid-
dle East, ‘perhaps we need a regional team – imagine if there was a team con-
sisting of Israelis and Syrians!’ (Ibid.: 289). In order to further substantiate 
this point, he refers to an initiative called Playing for Peace, where Israelis and 
Palestinian teenagers play basketball on the same team, and which has yielded 
‘remarkable results’ in terms of changing attitudes of the two groups towards 
one another (Ibid.: 290). Baron concludes by emphasizing that reconciliation 
depends ‘on we-ness, on people acting jointly’ (Ibid.: 295). 
Cognitive and emotional changes
Cooperation triggers changes not only at the cognitive level but also at the 
emotional level, because cooperation induces a we-feeling and thus generates 
positive emotions towards the former out-group. This is a very important 
point, as studies have found that ‘when attitudes are formed in a process 
strongly grounded in emotion, changing attitudes is much more likely to suc-
ceed if the attempt at change is also made at an emotional level’ (Milanovic 
13
2016b: 1370f). It follows that reconciliation interventions – cooperation-
based or not – are likely to be successful if they manage to evoke emotions in 
their addressees. Milanovic uses this insight in his analysis of how the ICTY 
has affected the Serbian population’s conflict-supporting narratives, arguing 
that persuasion was most effective when the ICTY did not confine itself to 
establishing ‘cold, hard facts … in excruciatingly long, sterile, and plain bor-
ing trials’, but in addition used the power of the ‘visceral, emotional effect’ 
of the infamous Scorpions video, for instance (Ibid.: 1371). This video, which 
contains graphic footage of Serbian paramilitaries executing young boys from 
Srebrenica, left a ‘crack in the wall of denial’ (Petrovic 2014) still surrounding 
much of the Serbian population when it was first shown during the Slobodan 
Milosevic trial in 2005.
Apart from changes at the emotional level reconciliation equally requires cog-
nitive changes in the ways individuals engage in social categorization. But 
again, actively inducing such changes is fraught with difficulties – witness 
the large-scale attempt at abolishing ethnic categories launched by the cur-
rent Rwandan government or a similar campaign initiated by Burundi’s then-
president Bagaza in the late 1970s. Asking conflict parties to relinquish their 
pre-existing social identities in favor of a new superordinate identity may be 
unrealistic because, as noted above, people have a deep attachment to these 
identities. Samuel Gaertner and John Dovidio (2000) therefore proposed the 
Common In-group Identity Model, which allows members to keep their ini-
tial in-group identity but at the same time subsumes the former antagonists 
in a new superordinate category. However, skeptics have pointed out that 
a sustainable (and not merely temporary) re-engineering of social identities 
outside of the laboratory situation is difficult when powerful segments of 
society continue to invoke group differences and cultivate out-group biases 
(Hewstone 1996: 351). On the other hand, proponents of the Common In-
group Identity Model have demonstrated that this model holds even in situa-
tions of relatively intense social conflict such as Black-White relations in the 
United States (e.g., Dovidio et al. 2000). However, the scope conditions for an 
effective re-engineering of ethnic identities in the ‘hard case’ of post-genocide 
societies are not well understood. 
5 Reconciliation Dynamics in Rwanda and  
Burundi
As we do not have a well-established theory of reconciliation after mass 
atrocities yet, this research paper will inductively derive new theoretical pre-
dictions about the factors promoting or inhibiting reconciliation, especially 
those relating to the reconstruction of group identities. Harff (2003: 60) has 
compiled a list of cases of genocide in the second half of the 20th century. 
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From this list, cases used to illustrate the theoretical arguments put forward 
in this paper were chosen based on the following considerations: as reconcili-
ation takes time, ongoing as well as recently terminated genocides were not 
included in the sample. Secondly, case selection was limited to those countries 
that have experienced genocide as an ‘intimate crime’, a concept which refers 
to mass civilian participation in the genocide including neighbor-on-neighbor 
violence, and where the line between victim and perpetrator is often difficult 
to draw (Pouligny 2002). Not all genocides fall into this category – during 
the Holocaust for instance, atrocities were carried out (almost) exclusively 
by the state machinery and victims and perpetrators for the most part were 
not forced to co-exist afterward the genocide as most members of the victim 
group were either annihilated or emigrated. Naturally, cases where genocide 
was perpetrated as an intimate crime pose a comparatively greater challenge 
for reconciliation than cases such as the Holocaust, hence the present research 
paper focuses on the former form of genocide. 
Out of the remaining cases of post-genocide societies, I selected Rwanda and 
Burundi. While Rwanda has received quite a bit of scholarly attention, Bu-
rundi has been largely ignored in the existing reconciliation literature (but see 
Ingelaere 2009; Rieder 2015; Rubli 2013; Schraml 2012; Vandeginste 2014) 
and therefore deserves closer scrutiny. Rwanda experienced genocide in 1994 
(after several cycles of mass violence), and Burundi in 1972 and 1993. In both 
Rwanda and Burundi, the vast majority of the population are Hutus (84/85 
percent), 15/14 percent are Tutsi, and about one percent belong to the Twa 
minority (World Population Review 2019; Central Intelligence Agency 2018). 
In Rwanda, the Tutsis were the main victims of the genocide (which also 
targeted moderate Hutus, however) whereas in Burundi, Hutus and Tutsis 
victimized each other in genocidal violence. 
These cases were chosen to illustrate the theoretical argument developed 
above because they vary with regard to the factor of identity politics, with the 
Rwandan government imposing a superordinate national identity and a com-
prehensive reconciliation agenda on its population, whereas Burundi adopted 
a laissez-faire approach and largely avoided issues of identity and reconcili-
ation. While Rwanda and Burundi thus vary on the crucial factor identity 
politics, they are otherwise extremely similar with regard to their history of 
colonization, cycles of violence, size, population density, ethnic make-up, cul-
ture, and economic structure (Rieder 2015: 5ff), which facilitates cross-case 
comparison. 
In neither Rwanda nor Burundi should social identities be conceived of as 
ahistorical, objective and unchangeable group distinctions. Instead of being 
objectively given, they were socially constructed and exploited for political 
purposes. Over time, these social identities then became reified, i.e. they as-
sumed a taken for granted quality, which, as Rogers Brubaker points out, is 
‘central to the practice of politicised ethnicity’ (Brubaker 2004: 10). To this 
15
day, ethnic distinctions determine who gets what and why in both Rwanda 
and Burundi. While in Burundi the ‘ethnic factor’ has been institutionalized 
and thus officially recognized, in Rwanda ethnic distinctions – all the while 
having been legally banished – still play a role in determining who has access 
to the highest circles of power. This practice of ‘politicized ethnicity’ has a 
long history in both countries. Ethnic distinctions have long been skillfully 
abused by political elites to rally their constituencies around specific purpos-
es. Such manipulation was used by both the colonial and post-colonial elites 
and was highly effective in mobilizing large masses of people for inter-ethnic 
violence (Lemarchand 2004; Ndikumana 1998; Uvin 1999).
The historical origins of the Hutu-Tutsi distinction in Rwanda and Burundi 
are somewhat disputed. Peter Uvin, for instance, asks: ‘Did colonization, first 
by Germany and then by Belgium, create ethnicity ex nihilo, turning socio-
economic stratification into essentialised ethnicity? Or did it simply codify 
an already highly unequal and undifferentiated relationship between Tutsi 
and Hutu?’ (1999: 254). The primordialist perspective, which characterized 
academic discourse before the 1970s, nowadays still enjoys some measure of 
support – especially in media circles, which tend to be drawn to the essential-
ist view of the conflicts in Burundi and Rwanda as being about ancient ethnic 
hatreds. In scholarly discourse, by contrast, the social constructivist perspec-
tive, which also underlies this paper, became dominant in the academic de-
bate in the 1970s (Schraml 2012: 29f). Interestingly, however, some of those 
experts who nowadays belong to the constructivist camp, such as renowned 
Great Lakes scholar René Lemarchand, began their career as primordialists: 
in 1966, Lemarchand observed that what set Tutsis and Hutus apart were 
clearly discernible physical traits, with Tutsis possessing a tall and slender 
frame and Hutus being ‘short and stocky’ (1966: 404f). The essentialist view 
was inspired by the so-called ‘Hamitic myth’, according to which the Hutus, 
Tutsis, and Twa represent three distinct population groups, the Ethiopid, the 
Bantu, and the Pygmoid. According to this myth, the Twa were the group that 
had originally inhabited the region before the arrival of the Hutus, who in 
turn were conquered by the Tutsi invaders, whose allegedly ‘superior political 
and military abilities’ enabled them to outsmart the ‘far more numerous but 
less intelligent Hutu’ (Des Forges 1999: 36). Thus, according to the primor-
dialist view, ancient hatreds between the Hutus and the Tutsis, who could be 
distinguished based on their physical appearance and intellectual capacities, 
fueled repeated cycles of violence. 
Proponents of the social constructivist perspective, by contrast, object that 
there are ‘few linguistic, phenotypical, or social differences between Hutu and 
Tutsi’ (Waters 1995: 343), and maintain that it was the German and Belgian 
colonizers who institutionalized and thus cemented ethnic distinctions as the 
basis for their exclusionist practices (Scherrer 2002: 21). In fact, exclusion 
via ethnic differentiation has been a dominant theme in the history of both 
Rwanda and Burundi. Prior to their independence in 1962, both countries 
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were ruled as one territory (Rwanda-Urundi). The German and later Belgian 
colonizers used a divide-and-rule tactic, promoting Tutsi supremacy by grant-
ing important administrative posts and access to education to the Tutsi minor-
ity, all the while denying such privileges to the Hutu majority. In post-colonial 
Rwanda and Burundi, the ruling elites perpetuated this policy of division, 
resulting in various cycles of (genocidal) violence in both countries. Where 
Rwanda and Burundi part ways, however, is in the approaches taken by the 
current ruling elites to dealing with the legacies of mass violence, especially 
with regard to reconstructing the group identities that were used to mobilize 
for violence in the first place. Their diverging approaches will be explored in 
more detail in the following section. 
Rwanda’s comprehensive reconciliation agenda
Very recently Rwanda commemorated the 25th anniversary of the 1994 geno-
cide, which was unleashed when a plane carrying Rwandan President Juvénal 
Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprien Ntaryamira was shot down 
in early April, killing both heads of state and providing the Hutu extremists 
with a pretext for launching their campaign of extermination against their 
fellow Tutsi citizens as well as moderate Hutus. Not even one year before 
had the Arusha Accords been concluded, which were supposed to end the 
civil war between the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the Tutsi rebel army, 
and the Hutu government, and which provided for a system of power-sharing 
between both groups. In practice this meant that the then-dominant Hutu 
majority had to cede significant political power to the Tutsi minority. This 
created a certain security dilemma, which was further exacerbated when in 
October 1993 Burundi’s leader Melchior Ndadaye, the country’s first-ever 
elected Hutu President, was killed by Tutsi army officers. The assassination 
of Ndadaye only served to confirm the notion prevalent among Hutus that 
Tutsis were not to be trusted (Prunier 1999: 200), a fear which was then ex-
ploited by radical elements of the Rwandan Hutu elite to rally the population 
around the mass killings of Rwandan Tutsis after President Habyarimana’s 
plane was shot down in early April 1994.
While the international community stood by, unable to muster the empathy 
and the political will to rescue the tiny African nation from the worst carnage 
in its young history, hundreds of thousands of Tutsis as well as many moder-
ate Hutus were slaughtered in a matter of only a few months. The genocide 
ended in July 1994, when the advancing RPF managed to take control of the 
entire country. After the genocide ended, the RPF engaged in reprisal kill-
ings of Hutus, for instance in 1995, when RPF soldiers attacked internally 
displaced persons in the Kibeho Refugee Camp, allegedly killing several thou-
sand Hutus (Rever 2015). Even though in present-day Rwanda the security 
situation is relatively stable, subjective perceptions of security indicate that 
many Tutsi victims of the genocide still feel threatened by their fellow Hutu 
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citizens (Brounéus 2008: 55; National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 
2010: 59). 
Quite a bit has already been written about reconciliation politics in post-
genocide Rwanda, albeit with inconclusive results (e.g., Buckley-Zistel 2006; 
Buckley-Zistel 2009; Eltringham and van Hoyweghen 2000; Hintjens 2008; 
Kanazayire et al. 2014; Longman and Rutagengwa 2004; Thomson 2011; 
Vandeginste 2014; Zorbas 2009). There are few known cases in history where 
a government engaged in a comprehensive attempt at re-engineering those 
ethnic identities that had given rise to the genocide in the first place. The 
government’s suppression of pre-genocide group identities went hand in hand 
with the attempt to construct a new superordinate identity (Rwandité). Yet 
President Paul Kagame’s reconciliation agenda included not only the outlaw-
ing of the Hutu-Tutsi distinction, but also the prosecution of génocidaires 
through the Gacaca courts (a traditional justice system that was used in ad-
dition to prosecution by the ICTR in order to cope with the vast amount of 
genocide suspects), and re-education camps for former perpetrators (see, e.g. 
Staub 2006; Zorbas 2009). Apart from the government’s top-down campaign 
of reconciliation and identity engineering, grassroots cooperation has been 
promoted at the micro-level in so-called reconciliation villages, which have 
received hardly any scholarly attention, however (but see Mafeza 2013). In 
these villages, perpetrators and victims cooperate on a daily basis in the pur-
suit of superordinate goals such as farm work, the construction of houses, 
etc. Before discussing these bottom-up initiatives, however, I will take a closer 
look at the macro-level components of Rwanda’s reconciliation agenda and 
discuss how it has affected social categorization and the relationship between 
the former antagonists.
Scholars researching identity-politics in post-genocide Rwanda observe that 
as a consequence of abolishing the Hutu-Tutsi distinction, these group iden-
tities have not disappeared but merely moved underground (Zorbas 2009: 
130). Regarding the degree of reconciliation achieved through the govern-
ment’s policies, opinions diverge widely: one field study, for instance, quotes 
respondents as saying that ‘if there were no laws against violence, the geno-
cide would start again tomorrow’ (Brounéus 2008: 66). In a similar vein, a 
2010 survey found that almost 40 percent of Rwandans believed that certain 
segments of society would perpetrate genocide again, if given opportunity 
(National Unity and Reconciliation Commission 2010: 59). Scholars doing 
fieldwork in post-genocide Rwanda also detected resistance among their re-
spondents to the imposition of the new superordinate identity, as Eugenia 
Zorbas points out in her study on ‘hidden transcripts’: even though some of 
her respondents greeted the government’s promotion of Rwandité as a ‘com-
mendable aspiration’ (2009: 142), others failed to respect the government’s 
proscription of pre-genocide identities and were skeptical of the attempt at 
coercing Rwandans to feel differently about their ethnic belonging (Ibid.: 
141f). Another study, by contrast, sees more grounds for optimism, maintain-
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ing that ‘the policies of strengthening national identification while suppressing 
ethnic identities might have been efficient in promoting intergroup reconcili-
ation’ (Kanazayire et al. 2014: 501). The authors acknowledge, however, that 
their study was not representative and moreover faced certain methodological 
difficulties (Ibid.: 500f). Sigrun Moss and Johanna Vollhardt – who equally 
recruited a non-representative convenience sample – in turn find that there 
is a lot of ambivalence in the ways Rwandans respond to the government’s 
engineering of ethnic identities; they discovered that among respondents there 
was ‘rarely pure support for or outright rejection of the single recategoriza-
tion approach. Instead, participants provide a range of nuanced arguments 
discussing pros and cons of the policy’ (2016: 349). The authors consider the 
nuanced and varied nature of respondents’ views to be ‘surprising, given the 
strict norms and laws that proscribe a superordinate Rwandan identity and 
make it difficult to talk about group differences’ (Ibid.: 350). Philippe Rieder, 
however, is more skeptical. He acknowledges that even after months of in-
depth field research, the salience of pre-genocide group identities in present-
day Rwanda was very difficult for him to gauge. Rieder is rather critical of 
the government’s reconciliation agenda, identifying ‘the strong governmental 
focus on controlling the reconciliation discourse in Rwanda’ as the biggest 
hindrance to reconciliation (2015: v).
The impact of the macro-level politics of identity and reconciliation in Rwanda 
are thus strongly contested among scholars, even among those with intimate 
knowledge of the situation in Rwanda. It seems that superordinate identities 
cannot simply be dictated from above. There is, however, greater agreement 
in the literature when it comes to assessing the effects of micro-level coop-
eration initiatives on reconciliation, which seem to be almost unequivocally 
positive – at least this is what the limited number of studies on this issue sug-
gests. Analyses of cooperation at the micro-level have shown that over time, 
through sustained collaboration towards a common economic goal, negative 
and dehumanizing attitudes towards members of the other social group were 
transformed into positive and trustful relationships, as Ezekiel Sentama finds 
in his study of coffee and basket weaving cooperatives in Rwanda (2009: 
184). This happened not because those Tutsis and Hutus participating in the 
cooperatives deliberately set them up as a reconciliation measure; instead, 
they merely wanted to escape economic hardship and overcome isolation af-
ter the genocide. 
In a similar vein, Jutta Tobias and Karol Boudreaux’s research on Rwanda’s 
specialty coffee workers (2011) discovers a correlation between repeated and 
meaningful work contact between Hutu and Tutsi respondents on the one 
hand, and an attitude of reconciliation on the other. The authors interviewed 
more than two hundred workers and the interview data yielded a significant 
correlation not only between economic satisfaction and life satisfaction, but 
also between repeated and deep work contact with members from the other 
ethnic group and an attitude of reconciliation (Ibid.: 1). Respondents report-
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ed ‘high degrees of ethnic distance reduction and highly frequent social and 
work-related contact’ (Ibid.: 15). Moreover, longer-term cooperation seems to 
have contributed to perceived out-group variability in that interviewees from 
coffee washing stations that had been in operation for a comparatively longer 
period of time frequently expressed the conviction that the former outgroup 
was heterogeneous, that ‘they’re not all the same’ (Ibid.: 19). The authors 
found this to be an important predictor for reconciliation (Ibid.).
These findings are echoed by the – albeit extremely limited – research on 
reconciliation villages. In 2003, a large group of genocide perpetrators was 
released from prison, presenting Rwandan society with the daunting chal-
lenge of reintegration and co-existence. In this context, Prison Fellowship 
Rwanda launched the ‘Umuvumu Tree project’, bringing together genocide 
perpetrators and survivors ‘in order to find an innovative way of restoring 
their relationship’ (Mafeza 2013: 790). This involved not merely truth-telling 
and apologies, but also the joint building of houses as both survivors and 
perpetrators were faced with problems of poverty and homelessness. Faus-
tin Mafeza interviewed 50 inhabitants of these reconciliation villages, who 
reported that prior to joining the villages, they feared, mistrusted, and hated 
members of the other ethnic group, with whom they rarely communicated 
(Ibid.: 792). Just as in the case of the cooperatives mentioned above, those 
who joined the reconciliation villages did not do so because their priority was 
reconciliation – they merely participated because they wanted to escape pov-
erty and homelessness. ‘Solving these material problems greatly contributed 
to the restoration of party members’ relationships’ (Ibid.: 793). Yet coopera-
tion not only re-established trust and helped forgiveness, it also affected the 
ways in which participants engaged in social categorization, helping them to 
‘transcend the stereotypes formerly attached to conflicting parties and their 
respective family members’ (Ibid.: 795). Because of the intimacy of contact 
that comes with living in a reconciliation village, such a significant effect on 
reconciliation could be achieved. This squares with findings from the social 
psychological literature according to which ‘casual contact, even if frequent, 
is less likely to change attitudes than intimate contact’ (Yehuda 1998:174). 
Burundi’s laissez-faire approach
Just as its neighbour Rwanda, which has seen several episodes of mass atroci-
ties between Hutus and Tutsis in its post-colonial history, Burundi also expe-
rienced various cycles of (genocidal) violence inflicted by Hutus on Tutsis and 
vice versa. Ever since becoming independent from Belgium, Burundi endured 
six episodes of civil war and seven coups or coup attempts (Nkurunziza 2018: 
2). Interethnic violence between Tutsis and Hutus culminated in two genocid-
al episodes, one in 1972 and the most recent one in 1993, followed by a civil 
war that lasted until 2003. It was ended through the adoption of the Arusha 
Peace and Reconciliation Agreement for Burundi (Arusha Agreement) which 
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brought together Hutu and Tutsi representatives from political parties, civil 
society, the army, and the government, as well as the international commu-
nity. Signed in August 2000, the Arusha Agreement entered into force roughly 
one year later, and succeeded in ending the longest episode of civil war. It 
also brought the Hutus into positions of power, thus ending Tutsi domina-
tion of Hutus in Burundi since the 1930s (Ibid.: 10). The Arusha Agreement 
established an elaborate system of power-sharing between Hutus and Tutsis, 
thereby explicitly recognizing and legitimizing ethnic distinctions. Burundi 
has been viewed as a model of inter-ethnic power-sharing, prompting one ob-
server to note that the country comes ‘as close as any African state has come 
to implementing Lijphart’s consociational formula’ (Lemarchand 2006: 7). 
Observers initially greeted the Arusha Agreement’s consociational approach 
as the solution to ethnic conflict that had plagued Burundi for so long. Filip 
Reyntjens, for instance, observed that rather than cementing ethnic cleavages, 
the institutionalization of the ‘ethnic factor’ had softened inter-group divi-
sions (2016: 65). Peter Uvin also wrote that after Arusha, ethnic cleavages 
seemed to have lost their relevance, and instead, a ‘compromise-based and 
ethnically inclusive system of political governance’ had taken hold (2009: 
172). With the establishment of the ethnic quota system in the Arusha process 
the dominant fault-line in Burundi thus seemed to have shifted from an ethnic 
to a political one (Ibid.). 
Others, however, notably Philippe Ntahombaye and Gaspard Nduwayo, lec-
turers at the University of Burundi, were considerably more skeptical, writing 
that ‘the last few years have been characterised by a major meltdown of the 
social fabric. The social and political problems are now manifested in the 
identity issue’ (2007: 247). Ethnic identity in present-day Burundi, the authors 
continue, has become a tool ‘that can easily be manipulated for all sorts of 
objectives: conquering power, expropriating neighbours goods, killing etc. … 
A reciprocal, nurtured fear has become a permanent feature by creating a big 
psychological distance and an ethnic hatred that social contact should have 
eliminated’ (Ibid.: 248). Given this diagnosis, it is not entirely unsurprising 
that the Arusha Agreement unraveled more than a decade after its inception, 
as the new Hutu elite could not ‘resist the temptation of absolute power and, 
in some cases, the urge to avenge past humiliations’ (Nkurunziza 2018: 10). 
When in 2015 Burundi’s current Hutu president Pierre Nkurunziza sought 
a third term in office, violence erupted anew and the Arusha Agreement col-
lapsed, plunging Burundi into another cycle of violence which has left more 
than 1000 dead and hundreds of thousands displaced. 
Whereas Rwanda has instituted a comprehensive post-genocide reconcilia-
tion agenda, which includes the – albeit one-sided prosecution – of genocide-
related crimes, Burundi’s ruling elite has shown little appetite for institution-
alizing a transitional justice mechanism, probably fearing that its own crimes 
might be exposed in the process: ‘[N]one of the former opponents had an 
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interest in transitional justice. As many of them have blood-stained hands, 
their interests converge in having as little truth and accountability as pos-
sible’ (Vandeginste 2012: 359). While the Arusha Agreement did provide for 
the establishment of a National Truth and Reconciliation Commission – a 
provision which one observer considered to be ‘one of the most important 
for peacebuilding’ (Nkurunziza 2018: 32) – the current government never 
sincerely intended seeking accountability for mass atrocities (Ibid.: 16). How-
ever, even though the Burundian government is in a position to control the 
extent to which past crimes will be dealt with domestically, it cannot control 
the international investigation launched by the International Criminal Court’s 
(ICC) prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, who made use of her proprio motu pow-
ers to investigate crimes against humanity committed in Burundi after 2015 
(International Criminal Court 2017). This prompted Burundi to withdraw 
from the Rome Statute establishing the ICC in 2017 – a move that will not, 
however, affect the investigation into the situation in Burundi that is already 
underway. 
A prominent objection to transitional justice mechanisms – be they domes-
tic, hybrid, or international ones – is that digging up the past would re-open 
wounds and inhibit reconciliation and peacebuilding. However, some experts 
on Burundi believe that the opposite is true, that it is precisely this lack of 
accountability for mass crimes that has emboldened would-be perpetrators 
and made repeated cycles of violence possible; and that, if left unaddressed, it 
will lead to further violence in the future: ‘(t)he argument that re-opening past 
wounds would not be appropriate misses the point that such wounds have 
never healed and will not heal unless ‘historical silences’ are broken as they 
do not serve the victims’ (Nkurunziza 2018: 32). Yet this expert position is 
not necessarily shared by ordinary Burundian citizens, as Bert Ingelaere and 
Dominik Kohlhagen discovered after months of fieldwork in rural Burundi. 
According to the authors, many respondents were not interested in holding 
perpetrators to account and believed that it would be better for reconcili-
ation to lay the past to rest (2012: 52). Even though this attitude was not 
universally shared among respondents, and even though the sample was not 
representative, the study does call into question the assumption that holding 
perpetrators to account and uncovering the truth about past crimes will nec-
essarily be conducive to reconciliation. 
Nonetheless, in 2014 the National Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
(TRC) envisaged in the Arusha Agreement was finally established (Impunity 
Watch 2016: 2). The TRC’s future had been in limbo for more than a decade, 
and only when the Burundian government – having consolidated its power 
after the 2005 elections and having gradually regained its sovereignty after 
extensive international intervention in the Arusha process –  finally felt com-
fortable enough to launch a national truth-telling process (Vandeginste 2012: 
361), was the TRC finally instituted. In 2016 it began to collect testimonies, 
yet given the large numbers of Burundians who left the country during the 
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most recent surge in violence since 2015, it is highly doubtful that the tran-
sitional justice process will be neutral and not skewed in favor of one party, 
that witnesses will be able to testify freely and not be harassed, and that the 
TRC will actually have a positive impact on reconciliation. 
6 What Can We Learn From the Countries Under 
Scrutiny?
Even though Burundi and Rwanda share a history of genocidal violence be-
tween Hutus and Tutsis, they could not differ more in their respective ap-
proaches to post-conflict peacebuilding and reconciliation: whereas the 
Rwandan government has imposed a new superordinate identity, outlawing 
references to pre-genocide ethnic identities, and launched a comprehensive 
reconciliation program, in Burundi there is no official reconciliation agenda, 
and, rather than proscribing reference to ethnic identities, the Burundian con-
stitution provides for a system of consociationalism and thus explicitly recog-
nizes the Hutu-Tutsi distinction. Moreover, compared to the comprehensive 
approach to TJ adopted by Rwanda, in Burundi there has been no effective 
system of TJ so far, as the government continues to undermine the work of the 
TRC and obstruct the investigation by the ICC into crimes against humanity 
committed after 2015. The following table depicts these differing approaches:
Table 1
Original 
identity 
conflict
Post-conflict identity 
politics
Governmental 
reconciliation 
agenda
Type of TJ,  
if any
Rwanda Hutus v 
Tutsis
Abolition of pre-geno-
cide identities, govern-
ment-created superor-
dinate identity. Ethnic 
identities continue to 
be salient below the 
surface, however
Maximalist ICTR, 
Gacaca
Burundi Hutus v 
Tutsis
Ethnic identities legally 
recognized (conso-
ciationalism), seem to 
have lost some of their 
salience in every-day-
life, however
Non-existent TRC, po-
tential ICC 
indictments
Yet whereas in present-day Burundi, ethnic identities are out in the open, this 
was not always the case: President Jean-Baptiste Bagaza, who ruled Burundi 
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between 1976 and 1987, attempted to do what Paul Kagame is currently un-
dertaking in Rwanda, namely imposing a policy of national unity and thereby 
erasing the distinction between Hutus and Tutsis (Ingelaere 2009: 25). The fact 
that Burundi has experienced decades of violence after Bagaza’s imposition 
of a policy of national unity indicates that simply imposing a superordinate 
identity on conflict parties may not be very conducive to reconciliation after 
all. Neither present-day Burundi, nor present-day Rwanda can be said to have 
achieved a significant degree of reconciliation. Considering the large numbers 
of Tutsi genocide survivors that nowadays still feel threatened by their fellow 
Hutu citizens, Rwandan society seems far from reconciled. Even though a 
handful of studies find ambivalent to positive effects of the Kagame govern-
ment’s reconciliation agenda, these findings must be interpreted with caution, 
as they were not based on representative samples. Neither can Burundi be 
considered a reconciled society. Interestingly, before the 2015 re-eruption of 
violence, many observers believed that Burundians were relatively reconciled 
in that ethnic cleavages seemed to have lost their saliences in every-day life as 
a result of the consociational approach adopted by the drafters of the Aru-
sha Agreement. However, the relapse into conflict after President Nkurunziza 
controversially extended his tenure in 2015 casts doubt on this assumption, 
strengthening the position articulated by Burundian insiders such as Philippe 
Ntahombaye and Gaspard Nduwayo who did not trust the period of relative 
political stability following the Arusha Agreement in the first place.
Considering that the two countries have adopted such different approaches 
post-conflict, how can the similar outcome, namely the (relative) absence of 
reconciliation in both cases, be explained? Does it mean that the comprehen-
sive efforts undertaken by the Rwandan government were entirely in vain? 
Certainly not; it merely means that these factors interact with other (un-
known?) variables, and that future research needs to identify how these dif-
ferent factors interact with one another in promoting or inhibiting reconcili-
ation. I will elaborate on this point below. Also, even though reconciliation in 
Rwanda has not been realized to a significant extent, the country is at peace, 
as compared to Burundi, which descended into violence after 2015. While 
negative peace is not the same as reconciliation, it is a precondition without 
which positive peace cannot be achieved. 
It has been argued that reconciliation in Burundi requires that the perpetra-
tors of past violence be held accountable. Again, the preceding analysis does 
not warrant the conclusion that TJ would necessarily contribute to reconcili-
ation in Burundi: for one, even though it seems intuitively plausible that the 
culture of impunity emboldens perpetrators and breeds more violence, stud-
ies show that ordinary Burundians are not necessarily interested in holding 
perpetrators to account and prefer to bury the past. Secondly, the example of 
Rwanda demonstrates that even in a country with a comprehensive approach 
to TJ, involving both local and international elements, both restorative and 
retributive justice, nonetheless fear, suspicion, and anger continue to perme-
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ate society. Thus, a comprehensive approach to TJ that is sensitive of the local 
context is not enough to reconcile the former antagonists. 
This does not mean that TJ has no role to play in reconciling post-genocide 
societies – it merely means that if a country opts to seek accountability for 
past crimes, this measure alone will most likely not be sufficient to achieve 
reconciliation. What is of special importance here is not only that any type of 
transitional justice must be perceived as relatively even-handed, not prosecut-
ing members of one party to the conflict only, as it happened in Rwanda; and 
secondly, that TJ measures must take place in a supportive political environ-
ment. Research on transitional justice in the former Yugoslavia, for instance, 
demonstrates that where there is no or little support from the highest political 
levels for TJ, and where the political climate continues to be one of genocide 
denial and the cultivation of pre-conflict ethnic cleavages, TJ is very unlikely 
to have a positive impact on reconciliation (Ford 2012; Milanovic 2016b). 
As Stuart Ford explained, while it is possible for courts to help break down 
conflict-supporting narratives cultivated by the different social groups, this 
will only work if courts receive support from a broad range of institutions 
representing the different segments of society, rather than having to work 
against the divisive messages sent by these institutions (2012: 466f). Regard-
ing Burundi, it is thus rather unlikely that the TRC or the ICC investigation 
will have a significant impact on reconciliation, considering that there is no 
support for these mechanisms at the highest political level. 
The preceding analysis thus suggests that macro-level interventions aimed at 
reconstructing pre-genocide identities and achieving reconciliation require 
certain pre-conditions in order to have positive effects, and that these scope 
conditions are relatively rare in real-world settings. Now, while this sobering 
conclusion is bound to disappoint many, the analysis also suggests grounds for 
optimism regarding the effects of micro-level interventions on the reconstruc-
tion of antagonistic group identities. Intimate contact and regular cooperation 
towards superordinate goals experienced by the inhabitants of reconciliation 
villages had a significant impact on how they perceived members of the for-
mer out-group. Cooperation fostered both the emergence of a strong we-feel-
ing across the ethnic divide, thus changing the ways participants engaged in 
social categorization, and re-humanizing attitudes among participants. This 
indicates that reconstructing ethnic identification through voluntary, regular, 
and intense cooperation at the micro-level may be more conducive to rec-
onciliation than imposing a superordinate identity in a top-down, coercive 
process. While the studies on micro-level cooperation discussed in this paper 
were non-representative and thus their findings should be interpreted with 
caution, they do lend further support to the notion well established in the so-
cial psychological literature that cooperation toward superordinate goals may 
transform inter-group relations – even in the most difficult of all post-conflict 
settings. Yet one must keep in mind that even the best-designed and most 
25
well-intentioned cooperation initiatives at the micro-level will not translate 
into broader societal reconciliation if at the macro-level, deep-seated social, 
political, and economic inequalities are being perpetuated and the different 
social groups thus continue to harbor grievances against one another. In nei-
ther Burundi nor Rwanda have these inequalities been sufficiently addressed, 
which does not bode well for these countries’ future. 
Overall, no sweeping conclusions should be drawn from this brief empiri-
cal sketch; rather, more systematic, rigorous, and comparative studies will be 
necessary before broader inferences about the identity-reconciliation nexus in 
post-genocide societies may be made.
7 Conclusion
This research paper hypothesized that identity politics are a key factor for 
explaining the successes and failures of reconciliation processes. Rwanda and 
Burundi were adduced as examples illustrating how the widely different ap-
proaches chosen by the respective governments have affected the reconciliation 
process. In neither case have antagonistic social identities been successfully 
transformed after genocide, even though a distinction must be made between 
the effects of macro-level interventions on the one hand, and micro-level ini-
tiatives on the other. Coercively creating a superordinate national identity, as 
attempted by Kagame in Rwanda and Bagaza in Burundi, was apparently not 
very successful. Cooperation at the micro-level, by contrast, which lacked this 
coercive character and which enabled intimate social contact between the for-
mer antagonists, seems to have been rather effective in reconstructing social 
identities and promoting reconciliation. The preceding analysis also indicates 
an ambivalent role for transitional justice in post-genocide societies. It seems 
that TJ can only be effective if perceived as being applied in an even-handed 
fashion, and if the political environment is supportive of accountability-seek-
ing. Both conditions are rarely found in post-genocide societies.
However, as emphasized earlier, the empirical analysis carried out in this pa-
per was merely intended as a first plausibility probe into the identity-recon-
ciliation nexus in post-conflict societies. A full exploration of this nexus will 
require much more systematic, rigorous, and comparative analysis. One of 
the issues requiring further study is the question of material factors in the rec-
onciliation equation. Preliminary evidence indicates that addressing people’s 
material needs such as poverty and homelessness significantly contributed to 
restoring positive relationships with members of the other social group. Yet 
the question of the extent to which such economic variables are a necessary 
condition for reconciliation could not be answered conclusively and thus mer-
its further scrutiny. Another unresolved issue regards the ‘time factor’, i.e. 
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the question to what extent younger people who have not been affected by 
conflict to the same extent as older generations are more inclined to abandon 
conflict-supporting narratives and enemy images, and are thus more amena-
ble to reconciliation. A recent study on reconciliation in Rwanda suggests that 
age may indeed be a relevant variable (Moss and Vollhardt 2016: 252). In 
sum then, there are many pieces of the reconciliation puzzle that are still miss-
ing. This research paper has merely indicated where to look for those pieces.
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Abstract
The question of how societies emerging from genocide manage to return to 
normalcy, restore social relationships and lay the foundation for sustainable 
peace, is a puzzling one. The guiding hypothesis underlying this research pa-
per is that identity politics are a key factor for explaining the successes and 
failures of reconciliation processes. We still know very little about the causal 
mechanisms underlying reconciliation, one of the reasons for this being the 
near-total absence of interdisciplinary work on this issue. However, one can-
not fully grasp reconciliation dynamics – which play out at the micro- and 
macro-levels – without synthesizing insights from different disciplines. The 
paper compares two post-genocide societies – Burundi and Rwanda – which 
have adopted extremely different approaches to identity politics and reconcil-
iation. Whereas imposing a superordinate identity in a top-down process has 
not been very effective in either case, there is some evidence suggesting that 
bottom-up cooperation has been rather successful in promoting reconcilia-
tion in Rwanda. Transitional justice in turn plays an ambivalent role. It seems 
that TJ can only be effective if it is perceived as being applied in an even-hand-
ed fashion, and if the political environment is supportive of accountability-
seeking. Neither condition is entirely fulfilled in Rwanda or Burundi.
Keywords  reconciliation, conflict resolution, genocide, transitional justice, 
social identity theory, self-categorization theory, post-conflict, Ruanda, 
Burundi, micro-macro level
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